Washington, DC – Late January this year, as a special guest, Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen attended a winter clothing distribution event sponsored by Jamaat-e-Islami. His praise for the organization’s humanitarian efforts—highlighting its orphanages and educational institutions—raises concerns about the nuances of political engagement within the humanitarian sphere. He referred to these ventures as “blessings for poor and orphaned children,” yet they exemplify a deeper ideological alignment with Jamaat’s agenda.
Notably, the ambassador visited Jamaat’s office on September 2, 2024, less than a month after Dr. Yunus’s government was installed by the student movement, which is now apparently backed by Jamaat and its student wing Chatra Shibir. Additionally, in late November of last year, the Chinese Communist Party invited Jamaat—a radical Islamist group—for a formal meeting in Beijing.
The recently emerging dynamic between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh is rooted in historical complexities. In 1971, China opposed the creation of Bangladesh staunchly, even vetoing its admission into the United Nations three years after its independence. Jamaat-e-Islami, during this tumultuous period, was complicit in some of the most horrific acts of violence the world has ever witnessed since the Holocaust, acting as operatives for the marauding Pakistani genocidal forces throughout the bloody nine months of conflict.
China formally recognized Bangladesh only after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nation’s founding father and the father of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. This recognition came under fraught circumstances, inferring a complex web of political allegiances.
Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in the lush fields of Punjab (now in Pakistan) in the early 1940s and was initially opposed to the creation of Pakistan. However, once established, the party positioned itself as a protector of Islamic values, which most believed the most distorted form of it, orchestrating violent attacks on the Ahmadiyya community in Lahore in 1953, resulting in the deaths of over 2,000 unarmed individuals. The organization’s history includes being banned only to be reinstated by Pakistani authorities, serving as enforcers during the atrocities committed by Pakistani forces in the 1971 liberation war. Jamaat’s youth wing allegedly murdered more than 1,100 intellectuals, most of whom fell victim just before the dawn of victory on December 16, 1971.
Following the Awami League’s defeat in the 2001 elections and again after the party was ousted from power on August 5 last year, Jamaat-aligned with its traditional ally, the BNP—led violent attacks against Hindu minority communities in Bangladesh, a pattern that is well-documented.
On a broader scale, the severe human rights violations in Xinjiang against the Uighurs are well recognized in international discourse. Yet, Jamaat, which presents itself as a defender of religious values and has an extensive network linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and most militarized Islamist outfits, remains conspicuously silent on these atrocities.
In an effort to counterbalance Indian influence in Bangladesh, Dr. Yunus’s government, with significant input from Jamaat, has leaned heavily towards China. On March 26, which coincides with Bangladesh’s Independence Day, Dr. Yunus, the head of the government, is set to visit China.
Two contentious issues between China and India have emerged in the region, placing Bangladesh at risk of becoming a focal point for instability.
One of the most pressing concerns is the Teesta water-sharing agreement, a long-ignored issue by India that has inadvertently fueled radical sentiments in Bangladesh. During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China last July, she notably refrained from expressing enthusiasm for Chinese assistance in constructing a Teesta barrage project, likely to avoid straining diplomatic relations with India. Just last month, a significant demonstration against India’s Teesta policy unfolded along the river near the Bangladesh-India border. Organized by Jamaat-e-Islami and other radical groups, the rally was led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which had shared power with Jamaat during 2001-2006. The protest explicitly called upon China to intervene and develop the Teesta barrage, strategically situated near India’s most vulnerable point, the Siliguri Corridor.
Additionally, the rivalry between India and China over the Arakan region has become increasingly visible. India’s Kaladan project aims to connect Kolkata with its northeastern provinces, collectively known as the “Seven Sisters,” through the port of Sittwe. Meanwhile, China is advancing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the south, centered around the Taiyuppi port, which will eventually connect a 1,700 km road link to a Chinese province via Mandalay.
Compounding this geopolitical tension, Bangladesh currently hosts approximately 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, a population that could become a destabilizing factor if radical groups, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, align themselves with Chinese interests in Arakan. Thus, Bangladesh is fast becoming a playground for geopolitical instability between China and India.
Currently, China dominates the list of nations with which Bangladesh has a sizable trade deficit, amounting to approximately $16.4 billion, significantly higher than the $9 billion deficit with India. With the economy taking a nose dive during the last seven months of Dr. Yunus-led government, it is more than likely that Dr. Yunus will beg for a Chinese loan during his upcoming visit. This may lead to a Chinese debt trap that Sheikh Hasina so carefully tried to avert.
One of the defining features of Sheikh Hasina’s foreign policy has been her adept balancing act amidst the competing forces of global politics, all drawn to Bangladesh for their own trade and security interests. She has managed to maintain a healthy trade relationship with the United States despite Washington’s concerns over human rights and electoral processes. Simultaneously, she secured a $12 billion long-term loan with low interest to develop a nuclear power plant. While effectively dismantling ISI-backed terrorist networks within Bangladesh and curbing insurgency in India’s vulnerable eastern states, she also purchased submarines from China, which raised concerns in New Delhi. Sheikh Hasina navigated the complex interplay between Asia’s two geopolitical rivals, fostering robust trade relations with both.
Despite India’s skepticism regarding Bangladesh’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Sheikh Hasina made the strategic decision to abandon plans for a deep-water port at Sonadia, which would have been financed by Chinese loans and could have established a significant Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal. This move was calculated to avoid displeasure from both the U.S. and India. Though challenging, Sheikh Hasina expertly utilized all available resources and strategies to maintain this equilibrium, transforming mineral-resource-starved and disaster-prone Bangladesh into a burgeoning economy that grew from a $90 billion to a $460 billion economy in just fifteen years, all while contending with global recession and the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, these carefully crafted balances are beginning to unravel with the new regime now in power. China and Pakistan are increasingly exerting influence over foreign policy decisions in Bangladesh, leading to a resurgence of fundamentalist forces like Jamaat-e-Islami on one hand, while fostering antagonistic relations with India on the other. This shift poses significant risks to regional national security interests, affecting India and the West.
Rana Hassan Mahmud
Rana Hassan Mahmud is a Bangladeshi American political analyst who writes for leading Bangladeshi dailies. An Engineer by training, he studied at Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and University of California, Irvine. He is a human rights activist.
