NEW DELHI – The deepening military cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), now increasingly intertwined with the Russian Federation, has been a worry for the West for a while now. Once dubbed the “Axis of Evil” by then-U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002, this grouping of states has evolved beyond a mere rhetorical alignment into a somewhat tangible, strategic challenge to Western norms. As Pyongyang and Tehran continue to defy them, their shared perception of a common adversary, the United States of America, has fostered a partnership that, despite some contradictions and opportunistic nature, now extends to critical military technologies like missiles and, most recently, advanced drones, with Moscow increasingly acting as a key facilitator and beneficiary.
While not an official alliance, Iran and North Korea have had a military relationship for decades. Iran established formal diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1973, during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, Iran still felt wary of Pyongyang due to its close ties with the United States and South Korea. This changed dramatically after the Khomeini Revolution in the late 1970s. The new Iranian government was openly anti-West, and North Korea, which embraced the revolution, also embraced the anti-American vitriol as ideological kinship. Iran and North Korea found common ideological ground. This anti-Western ideology established the foundations for military collaboration, which existed throughout the protracted Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. North Korea was having economic issues and was isolated, and thus supplied Iran with arms and fighter jets, which it desperately needed because Western sanctions imposed by the United States and Western nations were making it more difficult for it to procure weapons. In 1982, Pyongyang emerged as Iran’s largest munitions supplier, providing 40 percent of total military imports through the provision of a full assortment of weapons, including tanks, artillery, mortars, and light weapons, in exchange for crude oil. The significance of these early military transactions lies in the fact that they involved not only the exchange of weapons but also the exchange of advisors and technical trainers.
And yet, the relationship between Iran and North Korea has never been a solidified alliance, but rather a convenient strategic partnership, with some opportunism on Tehran’s part as well. While abstraction exists with ideological ties and military exchanges with Pyongyang, Iran has steadfastly developed economic relationships with South Korea, North Korea’s angry competitor. South Korean companies played a crucial role in rebuilding Iran after the war and have continued to export both civilian and military goods to it. For a long time, South Korea was arguably one of Iran’s top ten trading partners. This two-pronged approach is indicative of Iran’s instrumental foreign policy regarding the national interest (both political and economic) taking precedence even when dealing with the “enemy of my enemy’s friend.” While there are notable instances of Iran demonstrating opportunism with North Korea, Tehran has maintained a diplomatic approach with South Korea. A prime example of these opportunistic nuances in Iranian diplomacy was Tehran’s establishment of full diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1989.
In contrast to North Korea’s proximity to Iran and position in the Persian Gulf and the Northeast region of Asia, the range of a traditional mutual defense alliance diminishes because these two states hardly ever represent a direct military threat to each other. Additionally, Iran represents a far greater military and economic force in the Persian Gulf than North Korea, which competes for its survival among superpowers. Iran has demonstrated that it has multiple foreign policy trajectories, such as its attempts to normalize relations with Washington during the Khatami and Obama years, through diplomatic efforts that demonstrate its willingness to separate itself from Pyongyang while pursuing engagement opportunities with the West. However, North Korea’s historical pattern of hostility towards the United States has never limited its approach to Iran.
Despite these fundamental restrictions, Western pressure paradoxically brought Iran and North Korea closer in delicate military areas, especially in the years following the Cold War. Cooperation in ballistic missile and nuclear technology has become increasingly important. Both countries are believed to have transferred nuclear weapon technologies and, more precisely, are working together on ballistic missile capabilities for reasons of national security and shared strategic deterrence objectives towards the United States. Significantly, Iran has developed its own series of Shahab missiles (Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3). The Shahab-3 is a derivative of North Korea’s Rodong-1 missile, having obtained technology and prototypes of the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles from North Korea. U.S. intelligence stated that the collaboration created a key proliferation pathway, with reciprocal visits by engineers and technicians accelerating the two countries’ respective efforts to develop nuclear delivery systems. Some experts think that underlying exchanges for maintenance and ongoing development continue even after Iran announced in 2006 that its partnership with North Korea had ended, suggesting a halt to technological support. Iranian scientists and technicians have even been reported to be present in North Korea during missile launches.
The emergence and proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), specifically suicide drones, which are a type of loitering munition, is a newer part of this relationship. North Korea has been interested in UAVs at least since the 1970s when the country developed its own means to counter American reconnaissance drones. Kim Jong Un’s regime has larger ambitions, represented by the Saetbyol-4 and the Saetbyol-9, both of which are significant reconnaissance and multipurpose attack drones that are clearly modeled after and are larger mimics of the U.S. Global Hawk and Reaper UAVs, respectively. In small indigenous designs and copying, acquired Chinese systems were much less ambitious. While these “copycat” drones represent a significant step forward in Pyongyang’s capabilities with respect to intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and tactical strike capability, outside analysts agree that we might expect little actual performance to match those of their U.S. counterparts because North Korea’s capabilities are sorely limited in terms of sensors, communications, engines, etc. These UAVs could help contribute to assessments of the allied military situation, extend intelligence footprints by hundreds of kilometers into South Korea, and provide early indications of the general threat capabilities, which would be especially valuable in peacetime. Beyond these platforms for reconnaissance and attack, North Korea’s quick development of suicide attack drones that use new AI technology is a greater security threat to the West. These recently tested drones bear a remarkable resemblance to Russia’s Lancet-3 and Iran’s infamous Shahed drones. Experts believe there may have been a technology transfer, speculating that North Korea obtained these designs from Russia, which most likely acquired them from Iran. Tehran may have gotten them by stealing or hacking Israel. These suicide (or kamikaze) drones, which are UAVs equipped with explosives, can strike targets over a range of more than 1,000 kilometers by crashing into them, essentially functioning as guided missiles. They hold the potential to hit both tactical and strategic targets with precision. The potential of these drones to strike targets at both tactical and strategic levels across land and sea has been emphasized by Kim Jong Un, who has personally called for their mass production. By launching drones into South Korean airspace in 2022 that Seoul’s military was unable to intercept, Pyongyang has already shown that it is prepared to use such systems.
The growing role of Russia in this relationship is the most recent and significant change. Moscow has strengthened its military ties with Pyongyang in response to its own military procurement requirements in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. Russia has already received millions of artillery shells and countless ballistic missiles from North Korea for use in Ukraine. The North Korean Korean People’s Army also supported Russia in the so-called “liberation” of Kursk Oblast, which Ukraine had recently occupied. Russia’s pledge to help North Korea produce Iranian Shahed-type loitering munitions domestically is currently a significant development. North Korea will be able to manufacture these powerful drones domestically thanks to this initiative, which Ukraine’s military intelligence chief referred to as a technology transfer involving the common work of Russian and North Korean specialists. Tensions over regional security, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, are expected to escalate sharply as a result of this action. Russia has a clear goal in mind: utilizing North Korea’s industrial base to enhance its own drone production capacity, which currently stands at approximately 2,000 Shahed drones per month, with plans to increase this to 5,000 per month. This partnership presents a vital opportunity for North Korea to acquire advanced manufacturing expertise, generate foreign exchange despite sanctions, and enhance its position as a military technology exporter, all of which will likely exacerbate its long-standing economic challenges.
Now, for the far-reaching implications for the West. First and foremost, it poses a serious challenge to the Western-led international non-proliferation regime, which is surely hypocritical and inconsistent in its ideals, as the same order would allow the State of Israel to enrich uranium without any protests. Tehran could develop (or is developing), through a back-channel mechanism, its nuclear capabilities without direct violation of agreements like the P5+1 because of the ongoing, albeit secret, nuclear and missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea, and thereby become a “threshold state” that could quickly weaponize.
Secondly, the United States’ interests and allies, particularly Israel in the Middle East, are directly threatened by North Korea’s military exports, especially drones and missiles. Jerusalem views North Korea as a serious security threat because it supports Arab regimes and Palestinian militant groups, as evidenced by its supply of tunnel-building materials and defensive measures to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The Israeli challenge is that it cannot intercept shipments, given the immense distance, the absence of intelligence or situational awareness, and the need to cooperate with the United States and South Korea in any operational action against this threat. This is further fueled by fears of North Korea’s development of strategic weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Finally, denuclearization attempts are made much more difficult by this connection. Pyongyang was concerned about the possibility that Washington would lose face as a credible negotiator, compounded by the USA’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2018. With its sophisticated nuclear program, North Korea views the JCPOA as a draft agreement. It wants better terms that will enable it to produce additional nuclear weapons while doing more than Iran in this context. Therefore, there is a delicate situation in which North Korea and Iran can potentially coordinate their requirements and information to obtain terms that are at least as favorable as those provided by the United States. In light of the recent missile strike exchange between Iran and Israel and the strike by the USA on Iranian nuclear sites, it now seems highly unlikely that Iran would be willing to negotiate denuclearization.
Samyak Mishra
Samyak Mishra is pursuing International Relations, Political Science, and China Studies at Ashoka University, India. His academic interests center on East Asian authoritarianism and totalitarianism, the politics of one-party states, and civil-military relations, with a particular focus on the ideological and institutional foundations of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
